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Abstract
User acceptance of new support systems typically has been evaluated after the
systems are specified, designed, and built. The current study attempts to assess user
acceptance of an Automatic-Aided Target Recognition (ATR) system using an emulation
of such a proposed system. The detection accuracy and false alarm level of the ATR
system were varied systematically, and subjects rated the tactical value of systems
exhibiting different performance levels. Both detection accuracy and false alarm level
affected the subjects' ratings. The data from two experiments suggest a cut-off point in
ATR performance below which the subjects saw little tactical value in the system. An
ATR system seems to have obvious tactical value only if it functions at a correct
detection rate of .7 or better with a false alarm level of .167 false alarms per square
degree or fewer.
INTRODUCTION
A wide variety of both current and
proposed avionics systems are
intended to meet the needs of Army
rotorcraft pilots. These systems range
from electronic maps and notepads to
autonomous systems that locate a
target, navigate to an optimal firing
point, select the proper weapon, and
engage the target. The trend is for
such systems to become increasingly
complex and intelligent, and to
assume more of what are traditionally
the pilot's responsibilities. Given the
life or death consequences in the
aviation environment, aviators who
use complex systems must have both
a high level of skill in operating those
systems and a high level of confidence
in the capabilities of their systems.
Pilots must understand fully what the
systems can and cannot do, and they
must develop a feel for the conditions
under which their systems are more
likely and less likely to function as
needed.
User confidence in any system is
some function of the experienced
value of the system's information
handling. One important component
of value appears to be the overall
accuracy of the system's output. If the
user can clearly see errors in the
system's knowledge base, reasoning,
or other aspects of system operation,
the value as perceived by the user
may well suffer. Subtle or undetected
errors can also have profound effects.
If the user focuses on only the most
abstract level of system output, there
could bea false sense of certainty
leading to a catastrophic outcome
such as that encountered by the
U.S.S. Vincennes (Friedman, 1989).
In this incident which resulted in the
shooting down of Iran Air Flight 655,
many of the high level system outputs
fit the situation-specific expectations of
the users, and little if any effort was
directed toward understanding what
lay behind the high-level outputs. In
this case, several small errors masked
by users' confidence in their system
cascaded into a tragedy.
Below the highest level, other
system characteristics may determine
the perceived value of a system.
These include user access to
system-internal decision rules and
criteria, and the availability and quality
of information against which the user
may validate the system's operation
and output, Each of these factors
represents a way for the user to check
on the system's accuracy at run-time,
on a case by case basis, and begin to
build an experience base about those
conditions that result in better system
performance and those conditions that
lead to worse performance. Another
factor is the timeliness of system
output. In many cases, the value of
information or advice deteriorates as a
function of the temporal distance from
the conditions that gave rise to the
information or advice.
To begin our examination of the
parameters of user acceptance of
intelligent systems, we have
addressed the factor of overall system
accuracy. If a system is to achieve
any value in the user's eyes, obviously
it must perform at a level better than
chance. On the other hand, an
intelligent system may not need to be
perfect, an often requested level of
performance. This leaves us with a
broad band of system accuracy levels
to examine. Our starting assumption
was that somewhere in that broad
band there is a system accuracy level
that corresponds to a breakpoint for
user-perceived value. Performance
below that level is unacceptable, while
performance above that level begins to
accrue significant value in the eyes of
the user.
APPLICATION OF INTEREST
The intelligent system under study
here is an Automatic-Aided Target
Recognition (ATR) system that is
being considered for inclusion in future
Army helicopters. An ATR system
receives its inputs from a bank of
electronic sensors, performs a set of
pattern matching operations, and
presents the results of its analysis to
the helicopter pilot. In a combat
environment, the general rule is that
the first one to detect the foe controls
the engagement. The envisioned role
of an ATR system is to enhance the
pilot's capacity for early detection of
his adversary and thereby increase the
pilot's chances for survival and
mission success.
There are several views on just
how an ATR system will function in
future helicopters. The view that
places the least demands on
technological sophistication is one that
requires the pilot to position the
aircraft, execute a sensor scan,
withdraw from the scan position, and
examine the ATR results after moving
to a relatively safe location. This
usage scenario affords the ATR
system a substantial amount of time to
complete its analysis. At the other end
of technological requirements is the
view that the ATR system will operate
continuously, providing its outputs to
the pilot in near real time. This version
of the usage scenario requires the
ATR system to scan its environment
rapidly and to analyze its inputs
rapidly. From a timeliness
perspective, the second view seems
preferable, but as noted above, timing
is but one important property of such a
system.
The detailed specification of an
ATR system includes properties of the
sensors used by the system, the
pattern matching algorithms, and the
format in which the ATR results are to
be presented to the pilot. For our
purposes, we need only know the
general characteristics of the sensors
and the basic approach to the
algorithms. The sensor array can
include devices for visible light,
infrared, radar, acoustic, or other
components of the spectrum. An
adequate model of the pattern
matching algorithms can be found in
standard Signal Detection Theory
(Green & Swets, 1966).
As for the output format for the
ATR results, there are numerous
implementation from which to choose.
The output can range from a simple
text list of detected objects and their
location, to a symbolic overlay on an
electronic map, to an overlay on visible
source data, to an abstract
three-dimensional rendering that
includes spatially located sounds. For
our first study, we selected a
presentation format that used a
symbolic overlay on top of infrared
2
imagery. All of the pilots in our subject
pool had some experience with
infrared imagery, and we could gain
access to a large sample of
appropriate video-taped infrared
tactical scenes.
EXPERIMENT 1
Our goal for this first study was to
begin mapping the domain of system
accuracy and the ways that it relates to
user-perceived value. For anATR
system, performance accuracy can be
well specified in terms of the system's
correct detection rate and its false
alarm level. In addition, a"reality
check" can be independently
established from knowledge about the
actual location of targets. By
comparing actual target locations with
targets as detected by an ATR system,
subjects can begin to assess and
understand the accuracy of the
system.
For Experiment 1, video-taped
tactical scenes were obtained from a
field test of early ATR systems. The
various scenes were populated with a
broad range of military vehicles as well
as with a variety of target-competitive
clutter. From the video tape, static
images of infrared views of the scenes
were captured and used as a
background upon which to indicate the
location of ATR detected targets.
Subjects examined an ATR-processed
image, and then rated the ATR
system's apparent performance and
tactical value for that image. Following
the ratings, actual target locations
were marked, and subjects were able
to compare ATR-detected targets and
false targets with the real targets
contained in the image. Across a
series of such examine-rate-evaluate
trials, we expected subjects to learn
the operating characteristics of the
ATR system and to adjust their ratings
to fit the system.
Method
Subjects: Nineteen current Army
helicopter pilots, all males, served as
the subjects for this study. The pilots
ranged in rank from CW2 through
Captain, and they participated in the
study during a training session for the
Army's Light Helicopter program
assessment effort. Three of the pilots
served to de-bug and validate the
procedures, and the remaining 16
provided the data reported below.
Equipment: Two testing stations
were configured with a Sony
PVM-2030 20-inch monitor, a
Tektronix Tek-Touch touch screen
mounted on the monitor, and a
Commodore-Amiga 2000 computer
with an auxiliary Syquest SQ555 44Mb
removable disk cartridge system.
Task Description: Each trial in
the study consisted of six component
displays. An example of these
displays is shown in Figure 1. The first
component, shown in Figure la,
presented an infrared image of a
tactical scene with red arrows (shown
in Figure 1 as white arrows)
superimposed over the scene to
indicate the location of objects
detected in that scene. Subjects were
told that the red arrows showed the
results of ATR system processing.
They were to examine the display,
decide which of the indicated objects
were real targets and which were not,
and then to search the infrared scene
for real targets that the ATR system
might have missed. When finished,
the subject proceeded to the next
component display by operating either
the touch panel or the system mouse.
The second component display,
shown in Figure lb, added a rating
scale to the initial display. The scale
was presented vertically, in red, along
the left edge of the display, labeled
"HI" at the top, %0" at the bottom, and
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Figure 1 -- The six component displays for one trial showing a .5 correct detection rate
with four false alarms. The top four displays show the initial ATR output and the three
rating scales with white arrows instead of red ones. The bottom two displays show a
variation of the feedback display with false alarms marked by circles instead of yellow
rectangles.
with three intermediate unlabeled
markers dividing the scale into four
equal parts. Again using either the
touch panel or the mouse, the subject
positioned a pointer along the scale to
indicate his judgement of the ATR
system's correct detection rate for the
current scene. The pointer could be
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re-positioned until the subject was
satisfied, at which time, he proceeded
to the next component display.
The third display, in Figure lc,
erased the correct detection scale from
the left-hand edge and added a scale,
similar in appearance but in yellow, to
the right edge of the display. This
scale was to be used to indicate the
judged level of ATR system false
alarms in the current scene. For the
false alarm judgement, the subject was
told to base his rating on the number
of apparent false alarms in the scene.
Specifically, of the significant objects
indicated, are there many false alarms
or only a few.
After completing the false alarm
judgement, the subject went on to the
fourth component display (Figure ld),
one that removed the false alarm scale
and added a scale horizontally across
the bottom of the display in green. For
this scale, the subject was told to rate
the tactical value of the information in
the display. The instructions for this
scale told the subject that his goal was
to identify and engage a target and
that the tactical value rating was an
indication of the usefulness of the ATR
display in meeting that goal.
Following the tactical value rating,
the subject proceeded to the feedback
display (Figure le). In this display, the
infrared scene was overlayed with the
original red arrow indicators along with
indicators of the "ground truth" for the
scene, that is, the location of all real
targets. Specifically, the feedback
display included red rectangles drawn
around all real targets in the scene and
yellow rectangles drawn around all
false alarms reported by the ATR
system. In this display, correctly
detected real targets were indicated by
the presence of both a red arrow and a
red rectangle. Real targets that the
ATR system missed were marked with
just the red rectangle, and ATR system
false alarms were indicated by a red
arrow combined with a yellow
rectangle encircling the false object.
(In Figure le, rectangles mark the real
targets and circles indicate false
alarms.)
After inspecting the feedback
display, the subject went on to the final
component display (Figure lf) that
allowed him to review the trial by
selecting the raw infrared scene for
further inspection, the original ATR
output display, or the feedback
display. This review display was
intended to allow the subject a further
opportunity to understand the
characteristics of the ATR system that
was represented by the trial. As
described below, the apparent
performance of the ATR system was
varied widely and systematically.
Materials and Design: Video
tapes from an infrared camera
provided the source for all base
displays used in this study. The tapes
were created during the Multi-Sensor
Fusion Demonstration conducted in
1988 at Ft. Hunter-Liggett. A total of
25 test sites were included with a
variety of military vehicles placed at
different locations within the sites
across the numerous trials of the field
test. Using a FrameGrabber system
and a Commodore-Amiga, the base
displays were digitized at a resolution
of 320 X 200 pixels with a 16-level
grey scale. A total of 160 base frames
were captured from the 25 test sites
included on the video tapes. Each
base display was then graphics edited
to create a total of three variants of the
base yielding 480 stimulus displays.
The editing allowed us to enhance
objects in the scene, blur objects, and
even add and remove objects to meet
the requirements of our system
accuracy treatment conditions. Each
variant of a base display was assigned
to a different system accuracy
condition.
,3
Correct Detection Rates
.5 ,7 ,9
No, of Real
Targets 78 78 72 69
No. of Correct
Detections 24 39 $I 63
Max,per 2 3 3 4O_y
Min.p_
D_p_y 0 0 1 1
No, of Missed 54 39 21 6
Targets
Max.l_r 3 2 2 ID_olay
MI_,per 1 0 0 0
Ta_ I - Thetotalnumberd _I tarts per30disl_f_
andthebreakdowni tooorr_detectiort
missedtargets.
The design included four levels of
correct detection fully crossed with
four levels of false alarms. The correct
detection rates were .3, .5, .7, and .9.
The false alarm levels were 1.5, 1.0,
0.5, and 0.167 false alarms per square
degree of scene. Each of the displays
represented about three square
False ALarmLeveb
1.5 1.0 0,5 0.167
No, ol False
Alarms 135 90 45 15
8 6 3 1
2 1 0 0
Table2..,Thetotalnumberd fabealarmsp__ displays.
allowed both the detection rate and the
false alarm level to vary for individual
displays. Averaged across each
subset of ten displays, though, the
detection rate was exactly .5 and the
false alarm level was exactly 1,0 per
square degree. By varying the ATR
system properties from frame to frame,
we attempted to more realistically
represent the operation of a
functioning ATR system with its
probable variations as a function of
terrain and target types.
Table 1 presents the mapping of
real ta_ets to the four levels of correct
detection rates used here. Also
Included are the maximum and
degrees, minimum numbers of real targets
assigned to individual displays. Table
To represent an ATR system that 2 shows the same data for the four
seemed to perform at a particular level levels of false alarms.
of accuracy, we selected 30 displays
and marked correct detections, false
targets, and missed targets in each
display. A different set of 30 displays
was used for each of the sixteen
conditions defined by the factorial
combination of the four levels of
correction detection and the four levels
of false alarms. Within each condition,
the individual displays were
sequenced such that the averagq)
system performance level was met for
each subset of ten displays. For
example, in representing an ATR
system with an average correct
detection rate of .5 and a false alarm
level of 1.0 per square degree, we
In all, sixteen sets of 30 displays
were constructed, one set for each
combination of correct detection rate
with false alarm level. Each subject
saw all sixteen sets with the order of
the sets determined by a 16 X 16
balanced Latin square. In this design,
each treatment condition occurred
once in each ordinal position across
subjects, and each treatment condition
preceded and followed every other
condition equally often, thereby
balancing both first-order and
second-order sequence effects. In
creating the Latin square, the only
constraint on random assignment was
that no level of detection rate or of
false alarms immediately follow itself.
For each of the sixteen treatment
conditions, the set of 30 displays was
presented in three different orders. As
stated above, each subset of ten
displays in a set matched the detection
rate and the false alarm level for the
condition. Across every three
subjects, the ordering of displays was
rotated such that each of the three
subjects saw a different set of ten
displays as his final ten. This
counterbalancing of displays across
subjects means that no single display
can have an inordinate influence on
the findings of this study. The displays
upon which subjects base their ratings
can be treated as a statistically
random factor.
General Procedure: Each subject
in the study was given a 30-45 minute
instructional session during which the
procedures and ratings were
explained. A practice set of sixteen
displays was presented with one
display representative of each of the
sixteen treatment conditions. After the
instructions, subjects began working
through their sequence of the sixteen
treatment conditions according to the
order specified by one of the rows of
the balanced Latin square. They
completed one or two of the conditions
during the remainder of the first
session. The remaining conditions
were completed across three or four
subsequent 45-75 minute sessions,
depending on the availability of the
subjects.
As stated above, each of the
displays included in the practice set
represented one of the sixteen
treatment conditions. This fact was
emphasized as the subjects worked
through the practice set. The goal
here was to expose the subjects to the
full range of system detection rates
and false alarm levels so that they
could anchor their use of the three
scales to the range detection rates and
false alarm levels used here.
Results and Discussion
The data of interest were taken
from the last ten trials in each
condition for each subject. The first
twenty trials, then, were used to allow
the subjects to identify the
characteristics of the represented ATR
system and to adapt their ratings
appropriately. A complete analysis
showed no significant interactions
between the subsets of ten trials and
any of the other factors, although there
were numerical trends suggesting that
the subjects began a condition using
the middle of the scales and
modulated their judgements to fit the
treatment condition.
For the statistical analyses, the
subjects' placements of the markers
along the scale displays were
translated into numerical scores
between 0 and 100 with 0
corresponding to the "LO" labelled end
of the scales and 100 corresponding to
the "HI" end.
The statistical analyses presented
below used an analysis of variance
based on the Latin square. Such an
analysis uses a pooled, residual error
term to assess the significance of all
factors. The residual error term in this
study includes the usual subject
interaction sources as well as variance
attributable to the stimulus displays.
Since the exact set of displays seen by
the subjects was varied across
subjects thereby confounding stimulus
variance with subject variance, all
statistical conclusions can be
generalized to the stimulus population
as well as to the subject population.
The first two rating scales, those
for detection rate and false alarms,
were included in this study so that we
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Figure 2 -- Subject judgements of correct
detection as a function of ATR system
detection rates and false alarm levels.
could determine first whether the
subjects were sensitive to the
manipulations of system accuracy and
second whether the subjects were
using the rating scales in a sensible
way. The data for judged detection
rates are shown in Figure 2. There
was a significant main effect of the
correct detection rate represented in
the ATR system, F3.2_o = 42.78, p <
.01, and a significant main effect of
the ATR system's false alarm level,
F3,21o = 7.49, p < .01. The effect of
system detection rate is obvious in
Figure 2. As the system's detection
rate increased, so did the subjects'
judgements of those rates. The data
also show that the judged detection
rates were overestimated at low levels
of system detection and
underestimated at the highest level.
These findings are consistent with a
large body of subjective rating
literature on magnitude estimation
showing a less than one-to-one
mapping between actual magnitudes
and subjective magnitudes.
The main effect of ATR system
false alarm level is less obvious. The
highest level of false alarms, 1.5 per
square degree, yielded judged
detection rates substantially higher
than the other three levels of false
alarms. Most of this effect seems
confined to the lower levels of system
correct detection rates as evidenced
by a significant interaction between
system correct detection rate and
system false alarm level, F9.210 -- 2.03,
p < .05. One interpretation of this
interaction is that subjects may have
been biased by the "more is better"
notion. With a large number of false
alarms in a display, there are many
indicators of detected objects. The
subjects' judgement of detection rate
may have been based partly on the
erroneous assumption that some
proportion of the marked objects were
real targets. Alternatively, it could
have been that the information in the
infrared scene was not good enough
to allow the subject to reject all of the
false alarms. That would inflate the
number of objects initially accepted as
real targets and hence inflate the
judgement of correct detection rate.
The data from the subjects' judged
false alarms are shown in Figure 3.
The results here are straightforward.
There was a significant main effect of
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Figure 3 -- Subjects judgements of false alarms
as a function of ATR system detection rates
and false alarm levels.
ATR system false alarm level, F3.21o =
153.88, p < .01. Higher system false
alarm levels were matched by higher
judged false alarms. Again, these data
are consistent with other evidence
about subjective estimates.
Specifically, as the absolute
magnitude of the judged quantity
increases, the just noticeable
difference between two magnitudes
increases. Thus, a linear difference in
absolute physical magnitude often
translates into a decelerating curve for
the subjective judgements. In these
data there was no main effect of
system detection rate, F3,210 = 0.81,
and no interaction of detection rate
with system false alarm level, F9,210 =
1.20.
These first two sets of rating data
were collected to determine whether
our manipulations of ATR system
properties were detectable by our
subjects and whether the subjects
were performing in accord with
findings from a large body of other
work on subjective judgements. The
results described so far suggest that
our manipulations were effective and
that our subjects were performing
consistently. This provides a sound
basis against which to evaluate the
data from the subjects' ratings of
tactical value.
The initial hope for the tactical
value ratings was that they would help
to identify some kind of break point,
that is, a system accuracy point below
which an ATR system is quite
unacceptable and above which an
ATR system would be considered
valuable by the users. The tactical
value data are shown in Figure 4. In
these data, there was a significant
main effect of system correct detection
rate, F3,210 = 14.35, p < .01, a
significant main effect of system false
alarm level, F3,21o = 12.60, p < .01,
and a significant interaction of the two
factors, F9,21o = 2.69, p < .01. The
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Figure 4 -- Subject judgements of tactical value
as a function of ATR system detection rates
and false alarm levels.
tactical value ratings increased with
increases in system correct detection
rates, and the ratings also increased
with decreases in system false alarm
levels. The interaction lies in the fact
that at the lowest detection rate, all
four false alarm levels were rated
equally bad; while at the higher
detection rates, the lowest level of
false alarms diverged substantially
from the other conditions.
It is the interaction in the tactical
value data that best meets our initial
hope for this study. From the graph in
Figure 4, there appears to be a break
point at about 50 on the tactical value
scale. The two data points above 50
seem fairly well separated from the
cluster of data points below 50.
Several post hoc comparisons support
that conclusion, although weakly. The
two highest rated conditions are the
only ones for which appropriate,
rank-ordered paired-comparisons
approached significance. To allow
further assessment by the reader, the
standard error of the mean derived
from the Latin square residual error
term is 3.06.
The tactical value ratings support
some interesting conclusions that
appear to contradict some of the
statements made by our subjects.
First, it was said that an ATR system
needs to be virtually perfect before it
can be of any value. That does not
seem to be true in our data. Even our
low-end systems were rated as having
some tactical value. A second
common statement was "1 don't care
how many false alarms you give me,
just don't miss anything'. If this
statement were true, the ATR system
false alarm level should not have
affected the tactical value ratings, and
that was clearly not the case.
The findings from this initial study
are encouraging. The results from the
correct detection and false alarm
ratings clearly suggest that our
manipulations of ATR system
accuracy were detected by the
subjects, and the findings from the
tactical value ratings suggest that
these manipulations are important
determiners of user acceptance of an
ATR system. We view this initial study
as a baseline against which
improvements and enhancements can
be evaluated. From the data in Figure
4, it is clear that the best system
represented in this study was rated
slightly above 60 on the tactical value
scale. A rating of about 60 on a
100-point scale cannot be construed
as a particularly strong endorsement.
Alternatively, the numerical results
may be attributed to scaling effects.
Subjective judgements often tend to
cluster around the mid-point of the
scale, so the absolute level of the
ratings may not be fully indicative of
absolute levels of acceptance.
In designing this first study, we
focused on the type of ATR system
that places the least demands on
technological sophistication. From this
baseline, there are a wide range of
potential system improvements that
can be explored. The next study
incorporates one such improvement,
and it expands the parameter range for
system false alarm level.
EXPERIMENT 2
We have two concerns about the
first study that can be addressed
relatively easily. First, the stimulus
displays from Experiment 1 used a
fairly coarse digitizing mode of 320 X
200 pixels, and the displays were
presented on a 20" diagonal screen.
These two factors in combination yield
low quality visual detail. This may
have contributed to a dissatisfaction
with the information contained in the
displays. The subjects may not have
been able to discern real targets from
false alarms. In Experiment 2, the
displays were digitized using the 640 X
400 display mode, and they were
presented on a 9" diagonal monitor.
Because our source video tapes were
third-generation VHS copies of
high-resolution (875-1ine) original
tapes, this manipulation cannot be
characterized in terms of video
resolution. However, the increase in
pixel-level resolution along with the
decrease on the size of the monitor did
result in an obvious and sizable
increase in the visible quality of the
stimulus displays. Because of the
characteristics of the manipulation and
some of the procedural problems of
inducing the subjects to use the rating
scale in a way comparable to that of
Experiment 1, we consider this factor
as a preliminary look at the potential
effects of display quality.
The second concern focuses on
the question of whether our sample of
system accuracy goes far enough.
The best system represented in
Experiment 1 had a correct detection
rate of .9 and a false alarm leve! of
0.167 per square degree, and this
system received the highest tactical
]o
value rating. It could be that higher
detection rates or lower false alarm
levels would result in even higher
ratings. To further explore the upper
bounds of system accuracy,
Experiment 2 includes a lower false
alarm level of 0.067 false alarms per
square degree.
METHOD
Subjects: The same nineteen
pilots from Experiment 1 participated in
this study. One subject was run to
de-bug the procedures, and the
remaining 18 contributed the data
reported below. The time lag between
participating in the first and second
studies varied from 3 to 5 months.
Therefore, before participating in
Experiment 2, all subjects were re-run
on a subset of the conditions from
Experiment 1 in an attempt to ensure
consistent use of the rating scales
between the two studies and to remind
the subjects of the appearance of the
displays from Experiment 1.
Specifically, three conditions from
Experiment 1 (detection rate/false
Correct DetectionRates
.5 .7 .9
No. of Real
Targets 72 72 72
No. of Correct
Detections 36 51 63
Max. per
Dlaplay 3 4 4
MIn. per
Display 0 0 1
No. of Missed 36 21 9
Targets
Max. per
Display 2 2 1
Min. per 0 0 0
Display
Table3 - Thetotalnumberof realtargetsper30 displays
andthebreakdowni tocorrectdetectionsand
missedtargetsfor Experiment2,
False Alarm Levels
1.0 0.167 0.067
No. of False
Alarms 90 15 6
Max. per
Display 5 1 1
MIn. per
Display 1 0 0
Table4- Thetotalnumberoffalsealarmsper30displays
forExperiment2.
alarm levels of .3/1.5, .5/1.0, and
.9/.167) that spanned the range of
correct detection rates and false alarm
levels were used prior to the first data
collection session. In Experiment 2,
subjects were run in three sessions,
and, prior to the second and third
sessions, one block of trials from
Experiment 1 was presented using
displays from the .7 correct detection
rate .50 false alarm per square degree
condition.
Equipment: The only change in
equipment from Experiment 1 was the
change from a 20" monitor to a 9"
Sony CPD-9000 monitor.
Task Description: The task and
the sequence of events during a trial
were identical to those used in
Experiment 1. Because of the change
in pixel-level resolution, several minor
changes were required. First, all
scales were displayed in white instead
of in the colors used for Experiment 1.
Second, we were limited to a
maximum of seven total correct
detections, misses and false alarms in
a single display. Third, the format of
the feedback display used colored,
labeled pointers to indicate correct
detections, missed targets, and false
alarms instead of the colored
rectangles used for Experiment 1. All
of these changes were necessitated
by the hardware limitations of the 640
]1
X 400 display format.
Materials and Design: As stated
above, a new set of base displays was
captured using a 640 X 400 pixel
resolution with a 16-level gray scale.
As in Experiment 1, the base displays
were then edited to meet the
requirements for the various treatment
combinations used here with each
variation of a base display assigned to
a different treatment condition. The
descriptive statistics for the conditions
of Experiment 2 are shown in Tables 3
and 4.
The design included three levels of
correct detection rate crossed with
three levels of false alarms. The
correct detection rates were .5, .7, and
.9, and the false alarm levels were 1.0,
0.167, and 0.067 false alarms per
square degree. All three of the
detection rates were used in
Experiment 1 as were two of the three
false alarm levels. Thus, we have six
comparable conditions in the two
experiments to assess the effects of
the change in visible quality.
Experiment 2 also allows us to
evaluate the effect of a further
decrease in the level of false alarms.
General Procedure: Each subject
participated in three sessions. The
first session included a repeat of
ten-trial blocks from three of the
conditions from Experiment 1, as
specified above, followed by a
nine-trial practice set using the
displays for Experiment 2. During the
rest of the first session, the subject
completed three of the conditions of
Experiment 2. The second and third
sessions began with a ten-trial block of
one of the conditions from Experiment
1 followed by three 30-trial blocks from
Experiment 2. This procedure was
followed to ensure that the subjects
remembered the systems represented
in the first experiment and the quality
of display used in that study.
The order of treatments in
Experiment 2 was determined by a 9 X
9 Latin Square constructed with the
same constraints as in Experiment 1.
No level of correct detection rate or
false alarm level immediately followed
itself. The first nine subjects were
assigned to a row of the square, and
the second nine subjects were run
using the same Latin Square in
reverse order. This achieved the
same level of sequence balancing as
in Experiment 1. That is, each
treatment condition occurred equally
often at each serial position in the
sequence, and each treatment
condition preceded and followed every
other condition equally often.
Results and Discussion
A preliminary analysis examined
the data for interactions of the Latin
Square factor with other factors and for
interactions of the 10-trial subsets with
other factors. No interactions were
found; so, the following data analyses
are based on the last ten trials for each
subject for each treatment condition
using a residual error term pooled
across the two Latin Squares.
The findings for both the judged
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detection as a function of ATR system
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in Experiment 2.
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Figure 6 -- Subjects judgements of false alarms
as a function of ATR system detection rates
and false alarm levels in Experiment 2.
detection rate and the judged false
alarms mirror those from Experiment
1. The judged detection rate data,
presented in Figure 5, show a
significant main effect of system
detection rate, F2,12e = 121.78, p < .01,
a main effect of system false alarm
level, F2,12e = 11.74, p < .01, and a
significant interaction between the two
factors, F4,128 = 12.41, p < .01. As in
Experiment 1, judged detection rate
increased with increases in the
represented system detection rate,
and it increased with increases in the
system false alarm level. The
interaction is found in the inflated
judged detection rate for the
combination of high system false
alarms and low system detection
rates.
The data for judged false alarms, in
Figure 6, show only a significant main
effect of system false alarm level,
F2,12s = 327.66, p < .01. Here, as in
Experiment 1, there are substantial
differences among the system false
alarm levels but no consistent effect of
system correct detection rate. These
data also show that the reduction in
system false alarm level included in
Experiment 2 was clearly noticed by
the subjects.
The judged tactical value results,
shown in Figure 7, confirm the findings
from Experiment 1. System correct
detection rate had a significant effect
on the subjects' judgement of tactical
value, F2,128 = 81.31, p < .01. As the
system's correct detection rate
increased, so did the judged tactical
value. The effect of system false
alarm level was also significant, F2,128
= 18.56, p < .01, as was the interaction
of false alarms with detection rate,
F4,12e = 9.30, p < .01. As in
Experiment 1, judged tactical value
increased with decreases in system
false alarm level with most of the effect
occurring at the higher system
detection rates.
One specific result is of particular
interest. The two lower false alarm
levels do not appear to differ from
each other in judged tactical value.
The overall means are 48.11 for .067
false alarms per square degree and
49.83 for .167 false alarms per square
degree. At the higher two system
detection rates, the two false alarm
levels yield virtually identical tactical
value judgements. This is true even
though the judged false alarms clearly
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Figure 7 -- Subject judgements of tactical value
as a function of ATR system detection rates
and false alarm levels in Experiment 2.
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as a function of ATR system detection rates,
false alarm levels, and visible quality com-
pared across Experiemnts 1 and 2.
showed a difference between the two
system false alarm levels (see Figure
6).
The final aspect of the data to be
examined here focuses on the effect of
the change in visible quality between
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. In
the first study, the infrared display
used a 320 X 200 pixel image
presented on a 20" monitor. The
second study used a 640 X 400 pixel
image shown on a 9" monitor.
The analyses here include only the
sixteen subjects who participated in
both experiments• Thus, the data of
two subjects from Experiment 2 have
been eliminated. In apreliminary
analysis, we compared the three
ten-trial blocks used at the beginning
of the first session of Experiment 2
with the first ten trials of the
corresponding conditions from
Experiment 1. For all three of the
judgements, there was no significant
main effect of Experiment 1 vs.
Experiment 2 and no interaction of this
factor with the ATR system conditions
represented. This finding supports the
contention that subjects successfully
re-anchored their scale use to be
consistent with Experiment 1. In
general, this is true, but a detailed
examination of the data shows that
individual subjects did change their
use of the three scales from
Experiment 1 to Experiment 2.
Therefore, the following results should
be treated as preliminary findings.
The tactical value data graphed in
Figure 8 shows the comparison
between the first and second
experiments, and hence the
comparison of a low visible quality to a
higher visible quality. A
repeated-measures analysis of
variance on the 2 (false alarm levels) X
3 (correct detection rates) design
common to the two experiments
showed a significant main effect of
system correct detection rate, F2,30 --
25.73, p < .01, a significant main effect
of system false alarm level, Fl,ls =
20.38, p < .01, and a significant
interaction between visible quality and
system false alarm level, Fl.lS = 4.89,
p<.05. The two main effects are
consistent with the findings reported
earlier• The interaction can be found
in the fact that visible quality had no
effect on the higher level of false
alarms, while at the lower false alarm
level, the high visibility condition
received consistently lower tactical
value ratings• This result is consistent
with the suggestion that the higher
visible quality allowed subjects to
discern more false alarms using the
visual evidence, leading to lower
tactical value ratings
GENERAL DISCUSSION
These data focus on the
acceptance of a particular type of
system by a subgroup of that system's
potential user population. For current
Army rotorcraft pilots, an ATR system
appears to have an obvious tactical
value only if it functions at a correct
detection rate of .7 or better coupled
with a false alarm level of .167 per
14
square degree or better. Improving
the correct detection rate appears to
have greater value than decreasing
the false alarm level. Also, for the type
of ATR system represented here -- a
detection system -- showing pilots a
better quality of image does not seem
to offer much of a payoff as measured
by judged tactical value.
The qualifications of our
conclusions begin to draw in many of
the other issues that must eventually
be considered. Other population
subgourps must be considered. Other
levels of ATR systems must be
examined such as those that go
beyond detection to provide some form
of categorizing of the detected objects.
Other detailed implementations must
also be examined, especially those
that push the required level of
technological sophistication. An ATR
system that provides a near real-time
output may need different system
accuracy properties. Finally, other
measures must be taken and our
measures must be used in other
contexts so that we can better
understand the limitations of subjective
estimates of tactical value.
The preliminary findings reported
by O'Kane, Blecha, Do-Duc, &
Flaherty (1990) begin to make the
needed extensions to our approach.
In that study, subjects searched a wide
field consisting of five horizontally
overlapping static infrared images.
Each image was about seven degrees
wide by five degrees high, or roughly
twelve times the size of the images
used here. The subject's task was to
search the set of images and mark the
location of all user-identified real
targets. In one condition, noATR
system was available, providing a
baseline unaided search condition.
Other conditions simulated ATR
systems and varied the false alarm
level.
Several of the O'Kane, et al.,
findings are of interest here. First, the
difference between unaided search
and aided search appeared to be
mainly in the time required to approach
asymptotic performance. Time to
asymptote for aided search was about
two-thirds that for unaided search.
Given the projected usage conditions
for ATR systems, this is a necessary
finding, and it is in need of further
confirmation.
The second O'Kane, et al., result of
interest here is the way that the false
alarm level affected search. At low
false alarm levels, ATR-assisted
search was both faster and more
accurate that unaided search. That is,
more real targets were marked, fewer
false alarms were accepted as real
targets, and less time was required
when using the ATR system than
when searching the image without an
ATR. At high false alarm levels,
though, roughly equal numbers of real
targets were marked, and more false
alarms were marked compared with
the unaided baseline condition.
The O'Kane, et al., manipulation of
false alarms corresponds to .057 false
alarms per square degree on the low
end, and .171 per square degree at
the higher level. This re-casting of
their false alarm levels shows them to
be comparable to the levels used here
in Experiment 2, levels for which we
found no effects. It would seem, then,
that the search task detected an effect
of false alarms that our tactical value
ratings did not. Clearly, this is one
possibility. Search time and detailed
accuracy measures may be more
sensitive than the subjective
judgement used here.
Another possibility, though, is that
the effective manipulation of false
alarm levels lies more in the count of
false alarms per image than in the
engineering metric of number of false
]5
alarms per square degree. If the
number of false alarms per image is
the effective metric, then the
comparison would be between our .50
and 1.50 false alarms per square
degree conditions and the O'Kane, et
al., 2 and 6 false alarms per image. In
this comparison, both procedures
show effects of false alarm level.
Two final points need to be made.
Throughout this discussion, we have
talked about ATR systems as though
they had relatively static properties, as
though they performed entirely
consistently. That is not the case. A
given ATR system may perform very
well in certain usage contexts and
poorly in other contexts. Depending
on the terrain being surveyed, the
types of targets, and the types of
target-competitive clutter, the same
system could operate at different
system accuracy levels. Thus, in one
environment, the ATR system could
achieve a detection rate of .9 with
fewer than .2 false alarms per square
degree. In a different environment, the
same system could fall below a
detection rate of .7 and show a much
higher level of false alarms. In the first
case, the ATR system may have
substantial tactical value to a pilot. In
the second case, the pilot could opt to
turn the system off.
The second point is that the use of
an ATR system is likely to be mission
sensitive, On a scout mission, it may
be important that all real targets be
detected regardless of the level of
false alarms. In this mission, false
alarms can be filtered out before the
data on real targets is forwarded to
attack units. On the other hand, during
an attack mission, a large number of
false alarms may only distract the pilot
from the real targets and delay his
decision to engage, thereby losing any
advantage that the ATR system might
otherwise provide. A failure to detect
some of the targets during an attack
mission may not be that important. As
an example, using tactical knowledge,
the experienced pilot is aware that
where there are three tanks, there are
likely to be six tanks, along with their
supporting units. If the ATR shows
three tanks, the system may have
served its purpose of making the pilot
aware of his tactical situation.
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